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As an alternative to intentionalist accounts Direct 
Reference approaches to designation have achieved several 
successes, notably in the area of indexical reference. Arguably, 
however, these approaches have failed to produce a refined 
treatment of first-person, singular reference as it operates in 
natural language. In this paper I want to add to the growing 
corpus of work on Direct Reference Theory (DRT) and propose a 
way of treating the first-person nonintentionally. 
I 
For strategic reasons we begin by briefly presenting the 
intuitions and arguments that motivate DR approaches to 
reference. Chisholm advises that we distinguish between 
theories which emphasize the "primacy of the intentional" 
and those which emphasize the "primacy of the linguistic."1 
As I interpret it, DRT, at least of the variety for which David 
Kaplan is primarily responsible, belongs to this second 
classification. 
If we ask what is essential to any intentionalist theory of 
reference (IRT), we find a general assumption: that thought 
has a "directedness" to it. After Castaneda, we might call this 
basic datum "thinking reference."2 There are, however, strong 
and weak versions of IRT. The strong version of the theory 
claims that thinking reference is somehow fundamental to all 
other forms of reference. As Castaneda expresses it, "the 
semantics of a means of thinking...is a climactic part of the 
1Roderick Chisholm, The First Person: A Study in Intentionality and 
Reference (Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 1. 
2Actually Castaneda distinguishes between "speaker's thinking 
reference" and "hearer's thinking reference" in his presentation of a 
five-fold classification of reference. Nothing is lost, I believe, by 
ignoring the Gricean overtones in Castaneda's classificatory scheme. 
See, Hcctor-Neri Castaneda, "Direct Reference, Realism, and Guise 
Theory," (Unpublished, Indiana Univ., 1984). p. 3. 
Auslogung, Vol. XIV, No. 1 
88 AUSLEGUNG 
phenomenon of reference"3 (emphasis his). Reference that 
takes place by means of language must, again as Castaneda sees 
it, "eventually be tested against speaker's thinking reference."4 
It is a theory such as this that Chisholm has in mind when he 
speaks of the primacy of the intentional. On the other hand, 
the weak version of IRT does not insist upon primacy. It claims 
only a place for thinking reference. 
By comparison, the fundamental idea of DRT in its 
application to indexical expression is that the mechanism of 
reference operates independently of thought. Suppose I say, 
"That doesn't belong here." On the version of this theory 
proposed by Kaplan,5 the indexical terms 'that* and 'here' in 
this sentence possess both a "character" and a "content." The 
character of an indexical is the implicitly understood linguistic 
rule(s) governing the use of the word.6 The content is the 
referent of the term. Therefore, understanding the meaning-
rule or character under which "that" and 'here' operate, I 
express the above sentence in a given context, and in that 
context certain references (say, the ordered pair [dirty shirt, 
bathroom floor]) are automatically assigned to the indexical 
expressions at issue. Hence, 
KT.l. Reference is a function from particular, actual or 
possible contexts to individuals. 
The proposition expressed by the sentence in question is 
Russellian in nature. Hence, 
Castaneda, p. 3. 
4Castaneda/ p. 3. 
5David Kaplan, Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, 
Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other 
Indexicals (Unpublished, UCLA, 1977). 
6There is a difficulty here. The idea of a rule "in the sense of 
character" is ambiguous in Kaplan's theory. It has application both 
inside and outside of language. From the inside, as a user of a given 
indexical term, the character of that indexical allows one to fix the 
reference of it on a given occasion of use. From the outside, as a 
theoretician of language, the rule functions more as an analysis of 
whatever indexical expression is at issue. In its application as an 
analysis a rule may contain concepts which make it unrecognizable to 
a user. In this paper we are interested in the analysis-rule. 
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KT.2. Propositions consist, inter alia, of the contents of the 
indexicals used in the sentences that express 
them. 
If DRT is to serve as a challenge to intentionalist 
approaches to reference, however, these two theses are not 
sufficient. We need an additional claim. Consider the case of 
the ignorant heiress. Kidnapped, locked in the trunk of a car, 
and not knowing where she is or what time it is, she 
nevertheless utters, "Well, here I am now." What singular 
proposition is expressed by this sentence? According to Kaplan, 
the actual place and time of the heiress' entombment function 
as the contents of the expressed proposition even though the 
heiress herself is ignorant of these referents. Hence, 
KT.3. Ignorance of the referents does not defeat the 
referential character of indexical expressions. 
For Kaplan propositions must be detachable from the 
actual or possible contexts that produced them. It is only in this 
way that they may be evaluated from the perspective of 
different circumstances (i.e., possible worlds). It is this 
requirement that justifies KT.3. 
KT.3 has the anti-intentionalist effect of driving a wedge 
between the semantic proposition and what's going on in the 
heiress' head. It is for precisely this reason that Castaneda 
does not find DRT acceptable. The mechanism of reference it 
offers allegedly leaves out something essential (if one holds a 
strong version of IRT) or something important (of one holds a 
weak version). On the standard view propositions are the 
bearers of truth-value. According to Castaneda, while 
Kaplan's Russellian proposition may be what is truth-valued 
from a purely external point of view, it omits the "truth" that 
is experienced by the heiress. He comments. 
The truth she [the heiress] proclaims seems indeed to lie right 
there in the middle of her experience; it is the truth that there is 
quiet at the time of her experience as she experiences it and at 
the place where she experiences herself to be. She seems to be 
asserting a purely experiential and experienced truth, which 
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must, therefore, by thoroughly differentiated from the Russellian-
Kaplanian proposition...7 
Castaneda believes that we must admit of an "internal 
accusative of thought" to function as the truth that the heiress 
experiences. It is this internal accusative, omitted in DRT, that 
constitutes a structure (or the basic structure) of thinking-
reference for intentionalist theory. 
If we are to apply consistently the insights of DRT to I-
reference, the problem Castaneda raises demands an answer. 
The correct reply, 1 think, can be expressed as a dilemma. 
Either the internal accusative to which he refers is truth-
valued or it is not. If this structure is truth-valued, then it turns 
out to be irrelevant to semantics. If it is not truth-valued, then 
it is irrelevant to semantics for another reason. By either horn, 
DRT is warranted in neglecting the internal accusative, if there 
is such a thing. 
Suppose we assume that the accusative is a bearer of truth-
value. In what does its structure consist? If the heiress were not 
suffering from a condition of complete ignorance, we might 
picture this internal accusative as a structured entity containing 
certain mental representations of what, inter alia, 'here' and 
'now' single out. The referent of 'here' would be a mental 
representation of the actual place of the utterance, and the 
referent of 'now' would be a representation of the actual time of 
the utterance. 
This picture is no help to Castaneda, however. These 
representations were they to exist, would simply be modeled 
on—that is to say, their analysis would be dependent on—the 
primary referents contained in the K-R proposition. The 
referent of 'here* would presumably be a phenomenological 
representation of the car trunk and its spatial context, and the 
referent of 'now' would be whatever phenomenological 
representation the heiress could have of the actual time. The 
point, though, is that the internal accusative of thought would 
merely be a shadowy, mentalese imitation of the external 
proposition. There is no reason for a specifically semantic 
7Castaneda, p. 21. 
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analysis to elevate this structure to relevance. Thought would 
be "directed" in virtue of its function as internal speech.8 
But of course the heiress is in no position to display these 
representations to her consciousness. What, then, could function 
as the content of the mentalese counterparts to 'here' and 'now? 
What Castaneda says is, "there is quiet at the time of her 
experience as she experiences it and at the place where she 
experiences herself to be." This is by no means clear, but two 
interpretations suggest themselves. 
According to the first interpretation we simply abandon the 
claim that the internal accusative or "truth" is singular in 
structure. Perhaps the general proposition "There is an x and 
there is a y such that x is an experience of place for S and y is an 
experience of time for S and x and y have property F," more 
accurately represents the correct construction of the internal 
accusative. If this is the case, however, the burden of proof 
would seem to be entirely on Castaneda. For even if we assume 
this construction represents the general features of the 
phenomenological experience the heiress is undergoing, we are 
still left with the task of explaining what that construction 
has to do with the terms 'here' and 'now' as employed in the 
sentence, "Well, here I am now." Those terms do not appear to 
be operating semantically in the way the interpretation 
requires, i.e., as propositional functions. Instead they operate 
as singular designators. In this case and in the more general 
case the proper semantic treatment of sentences containing 
indexicals would seem to demand existential commitment to 
singular propositions. 
The second interpretation involves construing the internal 
accusative as a singular truth but taking 'here' and 'now' to be 
operating as definite descriptions for something on the order of 
"the quiet and dark place..." and "the eerie time..." 
respectively. On no construction, though, does this solution 
work. 
If a Russellian interpretation is placed upon these definite 
descriptions, singular propositions are surreptitiously 
abandoned in favor of general ones, and we are back to the 
8 c/ . , W. Sellars, "Language as Thought and as Communication," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1969): 506-527; and 
Christopher Cauker, "Thought as Inner Speech" (Unpublished, 
University of Cincinnati, 1987). 
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preceding solution. If the definite descriptions are interpreted 
along Donnellan's lines, then they are in fact not definite 
enough. They can accomplish neither referential nor 
attributive reference. 9 'Here' and 'now' cannot latch on to 
something rcferentially because there is no antecedent 
something in the mind of the heiress which these terms are to 
aid us (or her) in singling out. Furthermore, 'here' and 'now' 
fail to refer attributively~i.e., to refer to whatever happens to 
satisfy their disguised description—because there is no reason 
to assume that these descriptions or their mental 
representations are sufficiently definite to admit of unique 
satisfaction. Finally, if these descriptions are interpreted as 
elliptical for "the quiet and dark place where I am" and "the 
eerie time that it is," unique satisfaction is ensured only at the 
expense of affirming Kaplan's general point. For if the 
expressions "the place where I am" and "the time that it is" 
succeed in referring to the actual place and time of the heiress' 
captivity, they do so even though she is entirely ignorant of 
them; even though, as it might be put, she is not de re en 
rapport with them. 
We are thus led to the second disjunct of our original 
dilemma. I assume most proponents of DRT would find this the 
most plausible alternative. Whatever else is said of the 
internal accusative, it would seem not to be truth-valued. If we 
could project the stream of consciousness that characterizes the 
heiress' mind as she contemplates her problem and utters 
"Wel,I, here I am now," there is no reason to suppose this stream 
possesses propositional structure. The heiress is, as Castaneda 
says, "experiencing" quiet (and darkness) at the time and place 
of her cramped captivity. But this clearly does not warrant the 
thesis that "she seems to be asserting a purely experiential and 
experienced truth." What she is asserting is the K-R 
proposition; what she is experiencing is no truth at all. 
Therefore, the internal accusative insofar as it is an object 
of experience rather than a bearer of truth, would seem to be 
irrelevant to the project of semantic analysis. Alternatively, 
one might say that if the heiress' expression marks a "truth" 
which functions as an experiential accompaniment to the 
9Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," The 
Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 281-304. 
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semantic proposition, this sense of "truth" has no referential 
cash value. On this horn, in other words, the idea that 
thought has "direction" independent of language is simply not 
accepted. 
II 
Although this answer does not and could not serve as a 
comprehensive response to a matter this deep, it is sufficient to 
block the checkmate that intentionalist intuitions may seem to 
put in the way of a DR account of T. However, the puzzle we 
are left with is this. I have number of devices at my disposal 
for referring to myself. Consider just two of these—T and my 
proper name "KA." If what we said in the preceding section is 
correct, then I-propositions share in part an identical content 
with singular propositions that get produced by means of my 
proper name. A certain person, me, is the subject constituent of 
any token of this type. It might seem to follow, therefore, that 
the first-person pronoun T and the proper name 'KA' demand 
the same semantic treatment. So how can DRT account for I-
reference without assimilating it to a proper name? 1 0 
On the standard DR view of proper names 'KA' refers to the 
person who bears the correct causal or historical connection to 
the person who was baptized 'KA' in a certain time, at a 
certain place, in the actual world. In their recent book Knowing 
W/io, Boer and Lycan mistakenly assume that DRT will treat 
T as a proper name too. They write, "Note also that for some 
singular terms, such as indexical pronouns like 'you' and T, the 
'appropriately shaped causal chains' are so short and direct as 
to be degenerate cases." 1 1 But with T there are no causal 
chains, appropriately shaped or otherwise. To think of a use of 
T as a degenerate case of tagging something with a name is to 
endorse an entirely misleading picture of both the Causal 
1 0Note that IRT, in either its strong or weak form, is not faced with this 
puzzle. For the referent of T qua internal accusative will not be 
identified with the referent of 'KA'qua external proposition. The idea 
that the internal T refers to a metaphysical self of some description is 
a normal corollary to both versions of IRT. 
1 1 Stephen E. Boer and William G. Lycan, Knowing Who (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), p. 128. 
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Theory of Reference (one variation on DRT) and first-person 
reference by means of T and 'me.' 
This is not to say that T (or even 'me') cannot be used as a 
proper name. It can even be used as a definite description. 
Compare two cases. In the first case you wear a moustache. One 
day while shaving you notice splotchy bald spots, alopecia 
areata, in your moustache. You utter, "I am losing my 
moustache." Contrast this with a second case. You are an 
extremely famous scientist, well known for your public stands on 
controversial social problems. You are watching a play, and 
the play is about you. Midway through the play you are 
amused to notice that the false moustache on the actor 
portraying you is beginning to slip. You turn to your companion 
and utter, "Look. I am losing my moustache."12 
The same sentence is uttered in both of these cases and that 
sentence contains a use of T in the subject position. However, 
the first example discloses a "first-person" use of T whereas 
the latter example does not. Why is this? The answer is that 
the indirect discourse proxy for the first-person use of T would 
necessarily make use of the indirect reflexive locution "he 
himself." By contrast, the non-first-person use of T would not 
and could not utilize this indirect reflexive. 
Consider. In the first case it is appropriate to say of you, 
"He knows that he himself is losing his moustache." The 
reflexive pronoun 'himself is essential to this transformation 
because it grammatically represents the fact that in the first 
case your utterance of T is directed upon yourself qua performer 
of the utterance. In the second case the indirect use of the 
reflexive is entirely inappropriate. In this case we would not 
be tempted to say "He knows that he himself is losing his 
moustache/' We know from the description of the case that you 
are in no danger of mistaking the actor for yourself. Hence we 
would use a nonreflexive, singular term for the indirect 
discourse transform, (e.g.) "He knows that the actor portraying 
him is losing his moustache." 
This suggests the following criterion. An employment of T 
in a sentence of direct discourse is relevant to the semantic 
analysis of first-person singular reference if and only if the 
1 2Those familiar with Castaneda's "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-
Consciousness," Ratio 9 (1966): 130-157; will recognize this case as the 
one originally suggested by Norman Kretzmann in footnote #12. 
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transformation of that sentence into indirect discourse 
necessarily involves (after the relevant that-clause) the use of 
a grammatically indirect reflexive expression.1 3 This criterion 
filters out those conceivable uses of 'I' that have very little to 
do with the study of first-person semantics. If a parent were to 
name her child T, we would feel sorry for the child but would 
not confuse this idiosyncratic employment with the use of the 
pronoun T in natural language. I think we should assume a 
similar attitude toward the use of T as a definite description 
in the second case above. Clearly it is a possible use, but this 
does not imply that it will prove relevant to the analysis of 
first-person, singular reference. 
To return, then, to our puzzle: we want to put me in the K-R 
proposition whether I say first-personally, "I intend to write 
this paper," or whether I say "KA intends to write this paper," 
(or even "This man intends to write this paper"). But 
importantly we want the referential mechanism by means of 
which this is accomplished to differ in the two cases. The 
difference is to be sought in the divergent character of these 
two kinds of expression. We found the "he himself locution to 
be essential to the formulation of a criterion for first-person uses 
of T . Grammatically, as noted, the term 'himself is a 
reflexive pronoun. It is the concept of reflexivity, I believe, 
only now applied to semantics, that can help us to see how a 
first-person use of T differs in character from other devices of 
singular reference. 
I l l 
The idea of reflexivity analytically entails the notion of 
"turning back upon." Consider another reflexive expression, 
"this very phrase." Semantically we might, with Nozick, 
13Castaneda is primarily responsible for bringing the attention of the 
American philosophical community to the importance of the indirect 
reflexive in the analysis of 'I.' But in attempting to show that Thas an 
irreducible sense he did not think to use the "he*" device as a way of 
distinguishing between first-person and non-first-person uses of 'I.' 
For that, Geach's original note is more helpful. My use of the term 
"proxy" comes from him. See, P.T. Geach, "On Beliefs About Oneself," 
Analysis 18 (1957): 23; H-N Castaneda, '"He': A Study in the Logic of 
Self-consciousness," Ratio 8 (1966): 130-157. 
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describe this expression as a case of reflexive "self-reference."14 
What the phrase refers to of course is itself; on each occasion 
that "this very phrase" is tokened or replicated it refers to the 
phrase so tokened or replicated. It is important to note that to 
say a term self-refers in this sense is just to mean, neutrally, 
that it refers to itself. Reflexivity of this sort—i.e., that 
which "turns back upon itself" in the tightest possible way-
may be termed reflexivity of the "narrow sort." In the present 
example this reflexivity is provided by the introduction of the 
term "very" into the phrase "this phrase." Although one 
might use "this phrase" to single out itself, one can use it to 
refer to the same phrase on different occasions of use. The 
addition of "very" makes the phrase sensitive to its own 
tokening. 
It would be a mistake to suppose that T reflexively self-
refers in the same sense. Plainly T does not refer to itself. Thus 
if self-reference is predicated of T , the sense of this concept 
cannot be explained in the way that we explained narrow 
reflexivity. 
What sense, then, is to be given to the idea of self-reference 
in this application? While the reference of T is not itself, its 
referent is causally connected to itself. What T refers to on 
each occasion of its replication or tokening is the producer of 
that token. Since the reflexivity involved here is once removed 
from an explanation solely in terms of the reflexive pronoun 
"itself", we may term it reflexivity of the "broad sort." (Note 
that we may remain noncommittal about whether T refers to a 
"self," in the sense of a nonempirical agent who may somehow 
take itself as an object of its own reflection. A proponent of DRT 
will have no special inclination in virtue of his theory to 
endorse such an entity.) 
Initially one might believe that the description of broad 
reflexivity could be piggybacked upon the description of the 
reflexivity of "very," as in "this very phrase." On a view once 
held by Riechenbach, T just means "the person who utters this 
1 4See, Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 74. Nozick, too, makes use of the 
concept of reflexivity, but the analysis he offers differs in fundamental 
ways from the one being proposed in this paper. 
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token";1 5 and it is clear that he intended to say "the person who 
utters this very token." A refined version of this, incorporating 
the point made above, might be: T just means "the producer of 
this very token." One objection to this meaning-postulate is 
that it would make inexplicable the difference between the 
analytic and necessary statement: 
The producer of this very token is the producer of this very 
token, 
and the synthetic and contingent statement: 
I am the producer of this very token. 
Another difficulty is this. The reflexivity of "very" in "this 
very phrase" is a function of the reflexive used in its 
explanation, i.e., "refers to itself." If the explanation by means 
of the reflexive is rendered inapplicable—as it is by the fact 
that T does not refer to itself-then some other explanation of 
reflexivity of the broad sort must be produced. 
The advent of DRT shows why meaning-postulates of the 
type suggested by Riechenbach cannot function in a semantic 
analysis in the way that was once supposed.1 6 The expression 
"the producer of this very token" is not a synonym of T. By KT. 
1, this expression acts as a character which, together with a 
context, fixes the reference of T. 
The idea of using a character to fix a reference rather than 
to supply a synonym is borrowed by Kaplan from Kripke. 1 7 
What sets Kaplan's application of this idea apart from 
Kripke's, however, is that Kripke is concerned with the use of 
an accidental property of a thing (e.g. being the length of the 
1 5 H . Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York, N.Y.: 
Macmillan, Inc., 1947), p. 284. See also, Kaplan, Demonstratives, pp. 
43-44. And Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," 
American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967): 87. 
1 6Kaplan, Demonstratives, pp. 10-27. Sec, also, Kaplan, "On the Logic 
of Demonstratives," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) 
Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 401-412. 
1 7 See, Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 54-56. 
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standard meter stick in Paris) to fix the reference of a singular 
term naming that thing (e.g., "one meter"). While rules of the 
type envisioned by Kaplan have nothing to do with accidental 
properties, if the idea can be extended in the way proposed, 
Kaplan argues that indexical expressions fall into either one of 
two categories. 
These categories are defined by the manner in which the 
expressions subsumed get their respective reference fixed. 
Demonstratives, terms such as 'this,* 'that,' 'he' or 'she' require 
two elements to accomplish reference. They need, first, some 
appropriate character-e.g., "the reference of 'she' must be of 
the female gender." They need, second, an appropriate 
demonstration of the exact thing which meets the condition(s) 
specified by the character-e.g., "She (pointing to the person 
with the book in her hand) is a fine lecturer." Pure indexicals, 
on the other hand, terms such as 'today,' 'tomorrow' or 
'yesterday' require only an appropriate character-e.g. , 
"'today' refers to the day in progress." In their case no 
associated demonstration is required. 
Where does T fit? According to Kaplan, it is not a 
demonstrative; for, aside from emphasis, any demonstration of 
oneself accompanying an utterance of T is redundant. It 
therefore is to be classified with the pure indexicals. On his 
view the rule in the sense of character under which T operates 
is formulated by what Perry and Castaneda have called the K-
rule: In each of its utterances, T refers to the speaker who 
utters it . 1 8 
The advantage offered by Kaplan's account is immediately 
clear. It provides us with a mechanism for distinguishing I-
reference from other types of singular reference. As just noted, 
T is not a demonstrative. Further, the manner in which the 
reference of a proper name is fixed—even one's own—is causal 
rather than indexical in character. Finally, definite 
descriptions, at least in their basic use, accomplish reference by 
means of satisfaction; in the expected situation one and only one 
person satisfies the description "the conqueror of the North 
Pole." Hence, on Kaplan's view we can register the semantic 
1 8 See, John Perry, "Castaneda on 'He' and T " and Hector-Neri 
Castaneda, "Reply to John Perry," in Agent, Language, and the 
Structure of the World, James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (Indianapolis, In.: 
Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1983), pp. 15-42 and 313-328. 
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differences among reference by means of T , demonstratives, 
proper names, and definite descriptions. 
What we cannot do, however, is register the difference 
between the semantics of I-reference and the semantics of 
reference by means of the pure indexicals 'today,' 'tomorrow' 
and 'yesterday.' What I which to argue is that there is a 
"demonstrative-like" aspect to I-reference. This aspect is 
entirely absent in the paradigm pure indexicals. For note that 
in contrast with the pure indexicals, a demonstration of oneself 
may take the place of a use of T. This suggests the hypothesis 
that the broad reflexivity characterizing I-reference demands 
explanation of a rather unique sort. 1 9 
1 9 W e have not considered the indexicals 'here' and 'now,' and 
perhaps they demand a slight qualification to the above statement. 
Many have noted semantic similarities between these two terms and 
'I.' Kaplan argues that 'here' and 'now' can be used either 
demonstratively or as pure indexicals. Consider for simplicity only 
'here.' I believe we need to distinguish three different cases of this 
term's employment. 
First, there is the case where one might say, "We were here," pointing 
to, say, Tahiti on a map. This would seem to be a demonstrative use of 
the term 'here.' Second, there is the odd case where it might be 
appropriate to say "We are here," taking here to be wherever we in 
fact are. This case, made much of by Kaplan, seems to me not to 
constitute a pure indexical use of 'here.' For, arguably, 'here' is 
operating simply as the definite description (interpreted attributively) 
"the place where we are." Regardless whether the case constitutes a 
pure indexical use or not, 'here' would seem to be accomplishing 
reference nonreflexively. Third and finally, one can imagine oneself 
lost, in a cloud, on a mountain. Someone yells "Where are you?" and 
one replies "I am here." 
It may be better not to interpret this third example as a case of 
reference at all. "HERE!," one might contend, directs our attention to 
a certain location, but it does not single out that location. But if one 
does interpret it as a case of reference, it may perhaps seem to 
constitute a use of 'here' exhibiting broad reflexivity. It reflexively 
refers in this case, not to the producer of the very token but to the 
spatial location (defined arbitrarily) from which the voice producing 
the utterance "Here!" originates. Similarly, 'now' refers to the time 
(also defined arbitrarily) at which the voice producing the utterance 
'now' occurs. So, only with this third case do we get something 
semantically similar to T.' 
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I wish to propose that the explanatory notion necessary to 
explain the special reflexivity of T is that of surrogate 
demonstration. Think of a case where you raise your hand in 
response to a "Who?" question, (e.g.) "Who wants the last piece 
of cake?". The act of raising your hand takes the place of 
uttering an expression that singles you out. The demonstrative 
act is a surrogate for an act of singular reference. With T , it 
seems to me, the surrogate relation is reversed. The producer of 
T is performing the symbolic surrogate of overtly pointing to 
him or herself. It is as if T in language were an arrow, and the 
arrow always points at the agent who produced it. 
If this idea were to prove analytically instrumental, we 
would have a refined DRT treatment of T . This treatment 
would explain why an utterance of T , unlike the utterance of a 
demonstrative such as 'this', requires no additional 
demonstration. The demonstration has already been 
accomplished by the use of reflexive language. It would 
register, moreover, the demonstrative-like aspect of T in 
contrast to the pure indexicals. Finally, it would explain why 
the narrow reflexivity implied by the self-reference of "this 
very phrase" will not stretch to an explanation of the broad 
reflexivity of T . For this latter explanation we require the 
concept of a demonstration and its surrogate in language. 
IV 
But can the idea prove analytically instrumental? The 
notion that T operates in language as a symbolic arrow 
pointing to its producer will be seen as naive in several respects. 
There are, in fact, three rather strong objections to the very 
idea of using surrogate demonstration to explain the reflexivity 
of T . My own view is that each objection ultimately helps us 
change our hypothesis into a genuine analysis. 
The semantic account now on the table, modeled upon the K-
rule, is: In each of its first-person uses, T refers to the producer 
of that very token. Let us call this the Revised K-rule. But 
suppose the wicked witch, saying nothing, thinks to herself, "I 
am the fairest of them all." Assume that this use of T serves in 
thought to distinguish the witch from them all. Surely, it 
would be wrong to suggest, wouldn't it, that T accomplishes 
this task in virtue of a surrogate of self-pointing? 
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This is the alleged counterexample that will be presented 
against us by the proponent of IRT. The person who holds the 
strong version of that theory will conclude that our DR account 
omits just what is primary—namely, the nondemonstrative 
directedness of the internal accusative. The person who holds 
the weak version will find our account insufficiently 
generalizable. For it cannot apply to one form of I-reference, 
namely I-thought reference. 
Our earlier response to IRT indicates how we should answer 
this objection. If, as it seems to me most plausible to hold, the 
thought, qua internal accusative, is experiential but not 
propositional, then it lacks truth-value. If it lacks truth-
value, then it is not relevant to semantics. If, on the other 
hand, it is assumed that truth-value is to be predicated of the 
witch's internal accusative, then the mental image she presents 
to herself of the content of T* is simply a representation of what 
she would have demonstrated in a surrogate way had she 
spoken T . (Note that there is no problem about ignorance in 
this case.) The internal accusative in this counterfactual way 
will be modeled on the external proposition. 
Consider an analogous case: the written instance of T . 
Since no act of utterance occurs in this case, it may seem that our 
analysis is inapplicable. Now written uses of T fall into one of 
two categories: the fictional or the autobiographical. When T 
is employed by a character in a novel, it refers reflexively in 
virtue of a surrogate self-pointing to the fictional individual 
who produced that very token. Hence, the Revised K-rule, 
interpreted according to the referential mechanism we have 
accorded it, and qualified by a provision notifying the reader of 
the fictional character of the discourse, is an appropriate 
formulation of the semantic rule controlling the fictional T. 
The autobiographical use is more problematic. One could 
adopt a simple amendment to the Revised K-rule: In each of its 
first-person written instances, T refers to the producer of that 
very written inscription. However, now the idea of explaining 
the notion of broad reflexivity in terms of surrogate self-
demonstration begins to look less perspicuous. What we are not 
inclined to do in this situation is make up an entirely novel and 
distinct structure of reference. The more reasonable approach is 
to adopt a counterfactual application of our antecedent 
analysis: 
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Rev. K-rule (i): If a writer S uses T as an element in a 
written sentence of autobiography A, then S 
has performed what would have been an act 
of surrogate demonstration had T been used 
by S to communicate A verbally. 
Of course the pragmatic circumstances of the case may make it 
impossible to know to whom T refers in any given 
autobiographical use. The point to be underlined, though, is 
that even in a first-person use of T where no utterance-act 
occurs, the idea of surrogate demonstration, applied 
counterfactually, is the correct explanatory notion. 
The use of T in written autobiography provides the model 
for integrating the I-thought into our DRT analysis: 
Rev. K-rule (ii): If a speaker S uses T as an element in an I-
thought T, he has performed what would 
have been an act of surrogate demonstration 
had T been used by S to communicate T 
verbally. 
This amendment can be viewed as a transformation rule. It 
gives the mechanism for transforming the use of T in an 
internal accusative into a use of T suitable for producing a 
proposition of which semantics can deal. As with the case of 
the autobiographical use of T , we reject the intentionalist 
manuever in favor of a counterfactual application of the 
Revised K-rule. This reemphasizes the adherence of DRT to a 
theory that holds consistently to the primacy of the linguistic. 
The explanatory device we have employed in our analysis 
will seem naive for a second reason. A demonstration would 
seem to be subject to mishaps that are inapplicable to a use of 
T. Any given demonstration may fail to designate any object at 
all. It may fail to designate a unique object. And it may 
inadvertently designate an object other than the one intended 
by its performer. Are we to suppose that the semantic rule 
governing T allows for similar possibilities? 
This objection forces the recognition that the Revised K-
rule is not sufficiently revised. The type of demonstration of 
which a first-person use of T is an instance is, I believe, subject 
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to severe semantic restrictions. In this connection I wish to 
introduce the notion of a referential accident.20 
To introduce the concept we require a distinction between 
pragmatics and semantics, and, within this framework, some 
Kripke-like distinction between the speaker's referent, on a 
given occasion of utterance, and the semantic referent of the 
linguistic expression used to make that utterance on that 
occasion. 2 1 Roughly this distinction (drawn from Grice) holds 
that there may be a difference between the object to which a 
speaker intends to refer by means of an expression, on an 
occasion of utterance, and the object to which his words 
actually refer in language. A referential accident thus occurs 
when a singular term is unable to successfully accomplish either 
the reference the semantic convention demands or the reference 
that the speaker of the term pragmatically intends. 
Reference failure consists of course in the failure of an 
expression' to designate any referent whatsoever. Some 
philosophers, influenced by Descartes, take T to be immune to 
reference failure. The proposition expressed by the sentence "I 
do not exist" might be thought necessarily false. In my opinion 
one of the advances of contemporary possible world semantics is 
the insight that even first-person, existential statements are 
contingent. According to that semantics, the sentence "I do not 
exist" is possibly true. It is true "in," " o f or "at" all those 
worlds in which I do not exist. Hence our semantics of T need 
not build in an immunity to reference failure. 
The issue of referential ambiguity is more complex. Many 
context-relative indexicals, even sortally disambiguated ones 
such as "this phrase," fail (absent an accompanying 
demonstration) to designate a unique individual. If T referred 
reflexively on the model of "this very phrase," then its 
reference could not fail to be unique. But T always refers to its 
producer, and one might begin to wonder whether there might 
be, in some instances, more than one producer of '1'. Imagine a 
case of speaking-through-the-mouth-of-another. The speaker, 
qua mouthpiece says, "I want you to come to me," but the person 
responsible for the sentence is the mad psychiatrist. Could T 
2 0This concept was first suggested to me by Rogers Albritton. 
2 1 Saul Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," in 
French, et. al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2 (Minneapolis, 
Minn: U. of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 258-259. 
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be convicted of referring to both the mouthpiece-producer and 
the psychiatrist-producer? 
I would think not. If you were on the receiving end of this 
communication, you may not know whom to identify as the 
person wanting you. But this would seem to be a feature of the 
pragmatic context and not be salient to the semantics of T . 
Depending on how the details of the story are filled in we may 
want to identify the psychiatrist as the referent of T or we 
may want to identify the mouthpiece as the referent, but from 
this it does not follow that T could refer to both producers. T 
would seem not to be subject to that type of possible ambiguity. 
Consider, finally, the issue of referential misfiring. I 
intend to refer to Smith by means of the expression "the man in 
the closet reading Shakespeare." But since it is Jones rather 
than Smith who satisfies this description, the reference has 
misfired. Referential misfiring can thus occur in cases where 
the speaker's referent (the object the speaker has in mind) may 
diverge from the semantic referent (the object to which the 
words in language actually refer). Is it possible for the speaker 
of T to refer inadvertently to some producer other than the 
producer to whom he intends to refer? 
Consider this case. Ernst Mach looks into the mirror and 
says, "I am a shabbily dressed academician." Unbeknowst to 
Mach the mirror is angled in such a way that he is in fact 
viewing the image of someone other than himself. That person 
is the shabbily dressed academician. Someone might claim, on 
the basis of such a description, that Mach intends to be making 
a statement about the person in the mirror. If so, the argument 
continues, the semantic reference of T is Mach and the 
speaker's reference is the person reflected in the mirror. On the 
basis of such a possibility it might be claimed that T is indeed 
subject to misfiring. 
This conclusion betrays a confusion. We can agree that 
Mach's statement expresses a false belief. We would say of 
him, "He mistakenly believes that he himself is the shabbily 
dressed academician." We can agree, moreover, that if the 
statement were to be true, then it would have to be about the 
person reflected in the mirror. But this counterfactual 
formulation of the conditions under which Mach's I-statemcnt 
is true does not introduce a speaker's referent possibly divergent 
from the semantic referent. Mach's use of T signaled his intent 
to use that term in accord with the appropriate semantic rule. 
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and I am prepared to argue that this rule is sufficiently 
definite to rule out the possibility that he could intend that 
word to refer to someone other than himself. 
The argument I have in mind is best seen as a response to an 
objection that may seem irresistible at this point. Surely, 
someone will say, the speaker of T , in this case Ernst Mach, 
must "intend" or "mean" to be referring to himself by use of that 
pronoun. Isn't that "intention" or "meaning," the objector will 
continue, the salient semantic feature—a feature that your 
analysis entirely omits? And isn't it possible for that 
"intended" reference of T to diverge from what you call the 
"semantic" reference? 
Here again we have a variation on the strong version of IRT 
resurfacing. The defender of a DR approach to the first-person 
will point out that the concept of an intention is ambiguous in 
this objection. We must distinguish between a general or first-
order intention and a more specific or second-order intention. 
When a speaker utters (e.g.) "This...", he must have the first-
order intention to employ that term in conformity to a certain 
rule ("'this' refers to things in one's near spatial and temporal 
range"), but this intention is not sufficient to fix a reference. 
The speaker must have the additional, second-order intention 
to refer to some given item among those things in that range. 
The predication of reflexivity to I-reference amounts to the 
claim that this second-order sense of "intention" is 
inapplicable. Intention only comes in at the first-order level. 
That is to say, if the speaker of 'V has the first-order intention 
to use that term first-personalty, then that speaker, qua 
producer of that very token, is singled out automatically. In 
the case at hand, Mach indeed "means" or "intends" to be 
using'!* first-personally—not as a proper name or definite 
description. But given this, there is no further second-order 
intention controlling his first-person use of T . The character 
governing T assigns the reference to that term independently of 
what is going on in Mach's head. 
It is for precisely this reason that with the word T (in its 
first-person employment) there is only semantic reference. This 
is why no sense can be given to the thought that T could fix a 
speaker's reference divergent from its semantic reference. There 
simply is no speaker's intended reference. Hence, the conditions 
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requisite for the possibility of referential misfiring would seem 
to be absent in the case of T . 2 2 
Our analysis of the broad reflexivity of T is based upon the 
idea of a symbolic demonstration. But, as just noted, T operates 
under certain semantic restrictions inappropriate to the 
nonlinguistic act that informs its analysis, i.e., demonstration. 
In particular we must build into that analysis the apparent 
immunity of T to the accidents of referential ambiguity and 
referential misfiring. A more satisfactory formulation is: In 
each of its first-person uses, T refers to one and only one agent, 
the producer of that very token. This analysis involves, of 
course, amendments (i) and (ii). 
Finally, our characterization of first-person reflexivity in 
terms of surrogate demonstration may seem objectionable on the 
grounds that it fails to recognize the use of T in oratio obliqua. 
Here I would argue that we require not so much a revision of or 
amendment to the Revised K-rule, but rather a qualification. 
In the sentence, "Phillip believes that I ate the cherries," 
nothing significant turns on the fact that T falls within the 
scope of the prefix "Phillip believes that." The T still 
reflexively refers to the unique producer of that token. 
Here Castaneda provides a distinction that is conceptually 
helpful. 2 3 It is the difference between the external and internal 
construction of a singular term. Consider Chisholm's example, 
"Columbus believed that Castro's island was China." If the 
singular expression "Castro's island" is construed as internal to 
the psychological prefix, then it is being s u g g e s t e d , 
anachronistically, that Columbus himself could have referred 
in some language to Cuba as Castro's island. To avoid this 
interpretation the phrase "Castro's island" should be construed 
externally: "Columbus believed of Castro's island that it was 
China." "Castro's Island," now falling outside the scope of the 
psychological prefix, shows how the speaker of the sentence 
referred to Cuba, but implies nothing about how Columbus 
^This may be the point Sidney Shoemaker was trying to express some 
time ago when he noted that the speaker of "I" had "no latitude" in the 
determination of the reference of that pronoun. See, Sidney 
Shoemaker, "Self-Reference and Self-Awareness," Journal of 
Philosophy 65 (1968): 559. 
2 3 Hector-Neri Castaneda, "The Semiotic Profile of Indexical 
(Experiential) Reference," Synthese 49 (1981): 290. 
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himself referred to Cuba. Castaneda claims that all indexical 
occurrences must be construed externally; certainly the 
occurrence of T demands that construction. Thus in the case of 
Phillip and the cherries we get, "Phillip believes of me that I 
ate the cherries." The oratio recta occurrence of 'me' in this 
sentence is a first-person use of that pronoun, and, as such, 'me' 
reflexively refers to the producer of it. We are then free to 
construe the oratio obliqua occurrence of T as an anaphoric use, 
referring via the reference of 'me.' 
Let us take stock. First-person semantics is defined by a 
customary use of the pronouns T and "me" in natural language. 
We utilized the "he himself" locution to provide a criterion by 
means of which uses of T irrelevant to first-person semantics 
could be filtered out. This criterion pointed to reflexivity as 
the salient feature of first-person, singular reference. In an 
attempt to explain the nature of the reflexivity involved here-
-i.e., what was called broad reflexivity~we introduced the 
notion of surrogate demonstration. A use of T is the equivalent, 
in language, of an overt demonstration of oneself. However, 
this surrogate demonstration (by contrast with an overt 
demonstration) is constrained semantically in virtue of its 
immunity to the referential accidents of ambiguity and 
misfiring. Also, we showed how certain counterfactual 
analyses employing the idea of surrogate demonstration could 
account for the semantic reflexivity exhibited by the use of T 
in writing and thinking. These results constitute, I believe, an 
answer to those who follow Chisholm in claiming that a 
theory of the first-person which entails "the primacy of the 
linguistic" has little hope of succeeding. 
